

EUR18_18 - PAS IEC 63131 System Control Diagram Tutorial

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


Agenda

- Introduction
- Background for the method
- •The extend of usage so far
- The Standard
 - -The Function blocks
 - -The Diagram
 - -The Method

Introduction

- The system control diagram is a logic diagram which starts where the P&ID ends.
- It uses the process as background.




Background

- The challange to create the ICSS application for an offshore oil and gas platform on the Continental Norwegian Shelf.
- Some of the Framework
 - An offshore oil and gas platform covers 40 wells giving 200.000 barells of oil each day, produces it's own power, water, heat and may have a LQ with 200 beds.
 - The process medium is higly flamable and explosive, hence process safety is vital.
 - Process safety systems are integrated with process control on the operator station. Focus on no commen failure mode. Process safety actions is automatic and independent of process control in the application on controller level.
 - Process safety and Process control application to be developed in a systematic manner.
 - F&G system , Emergency shutdown, Process shutdown and process control.

Background - The history of logic diagrams - Statoil

- During 80thies use of Logic diagrams, elementary function blocks
- Norsk Hvdro did Osebera field development 1985 1989 and the



Usage - SCD referance list the first 10 years.

Project	Year	Operator	Supplier	Eng. Contr.
Brage	1994	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Kværner
Troll B	1995	Norsk Hydro	Honeywell	Aker
Heidrun	1995	Conoco/Statoil	Simrad	Kværner
Sleipner Vest	1996	Statoil	ABB	Kværner
Njord	1997	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Aker
Norne	1997	Statoil	Simrad	Kværner
Ekofisk	1998	Phillips	ABB	Kværner
Troll C	1998	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Umoe
Jotun	1999	Esso	Honeywell	Kværner
Visund	1999	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Umoe
Oseberg Øst	1999	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Kværner
Oseberg Sør	2000	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Aker
Oseberg Gass	2000	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Aker
Snorre B	2001	Norsk Hydro	Siemens	Kværner
Kvitebjørn	2003	Statoil	Honeywell	ABB
Grane	2003	Norsk Hydro	ABB	Kværner


Usage - SCD Usage recent projects

Project	Year	SAS	Eng.Contr. /SCD	Operatør	Proj type
Gudrun	2014	ABB	Aibel	Statoil	Greenfield
Eldfisk	2015	Siemens	Aker Solutions	ConocoPhillips	Brownfield Greenfield
Tyrihans	2009	Kongsberg	FMC	Statoil	Tie-in Kristin
Morvin	2010	Kongsberg	AK subsea	Statoil	Tie-in Åsgard B
02		Siemens	Siemens	Statoil	Tie-in
Kårstø NGL Meetering		ABB	MWKellog	Statoil	Upgrade
Valomon	2016	Honeywell	Samsung/ Technip KL	Statoil	Greenfield
Goliat	2017	ABB	Hyundai/ABB	ENI	Greenfield
Ekofisk Z	2013	ABB	Aker Solutions	ConocoPhillips	Greenfield
Jordbær		ABB	Samsung/ABB	TeeKay	Greenfield
Mariner	2018	Kongsberg	DSME / CB&I London	Statoil	Greenfield
Aasta Hansteen	2017	ABB	Hyundai / CB&I Haag	Statoil	Greenfield
Gina Krogh	2017	Emerson	Daewoo / Akersol. KL	Statoil	Greenfield
Edvard Grieg	2016	Honeywell	Akersolutions	Lundin	Greenfield
Johan Sverdrup	2019	Kongsberg	AkerSolutions / Aibel / KBR	Statoil	Greenfield

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Usage - within Statoil







The standard - What is the SCD concept

- Function blocks on a functional and operational high level
 - Tagnumbers on SCD corresponds to the object names on the operator station objects. Identifies 'the point of access' for operators.
- Control logic presented on a process-diagram, including the safety interlocks
 - Easy access to interlock logic during trouble shooting
- Focus on the control logic's mulidisplin stakeholder input
 - Secure best possible quality of functionality during design phase

System Control Diagram - SCD - PAS IEC 63131


- A method of designing control system logic.
- Consist of 2 parts





PCIC EUROPE

Classification: Internal Status: Draft




Function Template – 16 pcs

	CA – PID controller	(Continuous Analog)
	CS – Step control	(Continuous Step)
	HA – Manual analog input	(Hand Analog)
	HB – Manual binary input	(Hand Binary)
	KB – Sequence header	(Sequencing Binary)
	LB – Shutdown level	(Latching Binary)
	MA – Analog measurement	(Monitoring Analog)
	MAS – Analog measurement from subsy	/stem (Monitoring Analog Serial)
	MB – Digital input	(Monitoring Binary)
	OA – Analog output	(Output Analog)
	QA – Totalizer	(Totalize Analog)
	SB – Digital output	(Switching control Binary)
	SBB – El. breaker operation	(Switching Binary Breaker)
	SBC – Coordination of multiple SBE	(Switching Binary Coordination)
	SBE – Electrical equipment operation	(Switching Binary Electrical)
_	CDV Desurpretie (by deputie equipment of	

SBV – Pneumatic/hydraulic equipment operation (Switching Binary Valve)

FB usage statisticks – Johan Sverdrup project




Johan Sverdrup Production Platform

Standarisation of operation


Vendor 1

Monitoring of a	inalog process vari	able
<u>۲</u> ۳		
1000.0	Alarm limits:	Event limits:
08	900.0	700.0
	800.0	650.0
500-	300.0	100.0
0 -	100.0	50.0
0.0		
Process value:	488.5 b	ar
Freeze value:	200.0	Freeze
Faults: E	xternal fault	
Block HH	Block LL	Suppress


Vendor 2



Vendor 3



Object orientation



MA – Monitoring of Analog process value

A.4.6.2.1 Function templa	ite schematic
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 _			<u>Inputs</u>		MA		<u>Outputs</u>
	04 P	т – –	 - Normal function inputed External fault Force blocking alarred Force blocking alarred Force suppression a force supprese suppression a force suppression a force suppressi force su	n HH n LL alarm HH alarm WH alarm WL	FBLL B FUHH N FUWH FUWL A FULL E	HH WH WL ALL BLL	Warning alarm H ²⁾ Warning alarm L ²⁾ Action alarm LL
	AHH ALL	binary output binary output	Action alarm high-high Action alarm low-low]	BE	BLL BU BB	Action alarm LL is blocked Status suppressed Status blocked
				-	B	HH XH 3XL	Status event H Status event L
	BXH	binary output	Status event high status high	True, when I	X-value > Event high limit.No aları	m anı	nunciation, event only.
	BXL	binary output	Status event low	True, when	X-value < Event low limit. No alarr	m anr	nunciation, event only.
			Suppression on/off				Blocked Suppressed
	17		X and Y: Normal Input (X) an given terminal code other terminals.			t	te schematic


SBV – Output control of a Binary Valve

A.4.15.2.1 Function template schemati	ic
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	Inputs		SBV	Outputs
	Position high feed Position low feed	back XGL	YH	Normal function output Pulsed normal function output high
BCH binary output		It Y compared to feedback vali set low XOL XF g high LSH g low LSL ng high FSH ng low FSL nsition high FDH hsition low FDL FB	position high from MCC idated as true BCL BS BB BU	C or limit switch and tion output low Output position low confirmed Status safeguarding Status blocked Status suppressed Status auto/man Status outside
LSL binary input	Lock outside <u>Operator station:</u> Auto/Manual/Outs Lock safeguarding low . Safe m	LO side eguarding - signal overrule anual mode with Y- output cking. After signals disappe	to low -stop motor-). In	put is subject to s in manual mode
				Safeguarding Conflict


	<u>Inputs</u>	Inputs		CA	Outputs
	Normal function input External fault External setpoint value External tracking value Position low feedback Position high feedback Feed forward Lock safeguarding hig Lock safeguarding low Force safeguarding low Force safeguarding low Force safeguarding low Force tracking Force blocking Force blocking Force suppression Lock auto Lock manual Lock external setpoint	e e k yh v gh w	X XF XR XT XGL XGH XFF LSH LSL FSH FSL FSL FT FB FU LA LM LX LI	BCL	Measured value output Output position low confirmed Output position high confirmed
	<u>Operator station:</u> Auto/Manual Internal/External Internal setpoint				<u>Operator station:</u> Alarms and faults Closed Auto/Manual
LSH binary input	Lock safeguarding high.	Safeguarding - signal overrules operator inputs (locking the template t manual mode with Y- output to high -open valve-). Input is subject to blocking .After signals disappear the template remains in manual mode and the output high.			Ive-). Input is subject to
LSL binary input	Lock safeguarding low .	Safeguarding - signal overrules operator inputs (locking the template to manual mode with Y- output to low -stop motor-). Input is subject to blocking. After signals disappear the template remains in manual mode and the output low.		tor-). Input is subject to	


Figure A.2 - CA function template schematic




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Logic Diagrams for the programmer







Logic Diagrams for all «Stakeholders»




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Extent P&ID vs SCD





The main symbol - The Application Blocks



Elementary Function Bl




Table B.3 - Timer/pulse logic diagrams

Description	Symbol	Logic diagram
Inverter	A▶[]C-►	с
Timer (delay on rising edge)	A-→TC-→ 5 s	<u>c</u>
Timer (delay on falling edge)	A- ➡]]C-►	<u>c</u>
Pulse generator (pos. pulse on false – true)	A-►PC-► 5 s	<u>c</u>
Pulse generator (pos. pulse on true – false)		<u>c</u>

Table B.2 - EFB function notations

Notation	Function	Extended connection line	Terminals to be shown
0	Logic "OR" (X1 or X2 = Y)	Can be used	NA
&	Logic "AND" (X1 and X2 = Y)	Can be used	NA
≠	Logical "XOR" (Exclusive X1 or X2, Y=1)	Can be used	NA
Н	High selector (Y = the higher of X1 and X2)	NA	NA
L	Low selector (Y = the lower of X1 and X2)	NA	NA
>	Comparator high (Y = 1 when X1 > X2, otherwise Y = 0)	NA	X1,X2
<	Comparator low (Y = 1 when X1 < X2, otherwise Y = 0)	NA	X1,X2
+	Arithmetic plus (X1 + X2 = Y)	NA	NA
-	Arithmetic minus (X1 - X2 = Y)	NA	X1,X2
*	Arithmetic multiply (X1 * X2 = Y)	NA	NA
1	Arithmetic division (X1 / X2 = Y)	NA	X1,X2
Μ	Memory element (S=set, R=reset) ¹⁾	NA	S,R
S	Split of signal	NA	NA
#	Optional formula – Terminal names users choice. See	Can be used	All
	figure B.8.		
A	Analogue select by digital input Y=X1 when S=0, Y=X2 when S=1	NA	S,X1,X2

PCI 1) Dominant terminal to be indicated by underlining the terminal name. If no terminal is underline R=reset is to be considered dominant.

Positive logic - High or Low

•	High	(H)
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-Valve	Open


- -Motor Start
- -Heater On
- -Connector Connected
- Low (L)
 - -Valve Closed
 - -Motor Stop
 - -Heater Off
 - -Connector Disconnected

NOTE! SCD are ALWAYS drawn with positive logic


Signal ACTIV = ON (PÅ) = OPEN (ÅPEN) = HIGH (HØY) = 1 = True = Positive

Signal NOT ACTIVE = OFF (AV) = CLOSED (LUKKET) = LOW (LAV) = 0 = False = Negativ

Electrical reference symbol




Sequence by Sequential Function Charts (SFC)



The SFC SCD

SEQ. 04



A.4.13.2.1 Function template schematic

Inputs	SBC		Outputs
Auto start requested number	хн у	(1 – Y6 ⁸⁾	Normal function output
Auto stop all	XL		Function failed
Enable function	XE		Number requested
Request number	XQ		Status auto/man
Rotate priority	XP		One or more SBE in run
iterate priority			All SBE in stop
Call for 6 - increasing	X6H		Number running
Call for 5 - increasing	X5H	DOQ	Number running
Call for 4 - increasing	X4H		
Call for 3 - increasing	X3H		
Call for 2 - increasing	X2H		
Call for 1 - increasing	X1H		
Call for 5 - decreasing	X5L		
Call for 4 - decreasing	X4L		
Call for 3 - decreasing	X3L		
Call for 2 - decreasing	X2L		
Call for 1 - decreasing	X1L		
Lock auto	LA		
Lock manual	IM		
Lock manual	Livi		
Operator station:			Operator station:
Start requested			For each SBE :
Stop all			Running/stopped
Increment			Alarms and faults
Decrement			Available (SBE in auto)
Shift			Start disabled (FDH)
Set priority for each SBE			Stop disabled (FDL)
Set number requested as			Safeguarding
value			calogualang
Suppression on/off			Current priority
			Suppressed
Information from SBE ⁶⁾⁷⁾			Information to SBE ⁶⁾
Running			Set high
Failure			Set low
Enabled for			Priority
			 Phonty
duty/standby			
(auto mode)			
 Safeguarding 			
 Start disabled (FDH) 			
 Stop disabled (FDL) 			
Dependent of vendor solution.			

- 6) Dependent of vendor solution.
- 7) Will not be shown on SCD
- 8) Terminal name will be shown as Y1...Y6 connected to X on SBE 1 .. 6 on the SCD.


JDL							
			Inputs		SBE	Outputs	
			Pos high feedback External set high External set low External outside set External outside set External fault Externally enabled Lock safeguarding Force safeguarding Force safeguarding	: high : low (MCC) nigh ow high	XH ^{®)} YH XL ^{®)} YL XOH YF XOL BCH XF BCL XE BA LSH BOS FSH BB	Normal function output Pulsed normal function output high Pulsed normal function output low Function failed Output position high confirmed Output position low confirmed Status auto/man Status outside Status safeguarding Status blocked Status suppressed	
	BCH	binary	Output position high confirmed	Output Y	compared to feedback posit	tion high from MCC or limit switch and	
		output			validate	d as true	
			Force suppression Lock auto Lock manual Lock outside <u>Operator station:</u> Auto/Manual/Outsid Set output on(high) Blocking on/off Suppression on/off Suppression on/off	off(low)	FU LA LM LO	Operator station: Alarms and faults Running/Stopped Auto/Manual/Outside Blocked Suppressed Disabled Safeguarding Conflict Priority	
			External set high External set low Priority provided by			Run Fault Available (SBE in auto) Start disabled (FDH) Stop disabled (FDL)	
	LSL	binary input	Lock safeguarding low .	manu	al mode with Y-output to lo g. After signals disappear th	erator inputs (locking the template to w -stop motor-). Input is subject to we template remains in manual mode output low.	

7) Will not be shown on SCD.

9) Terminal name will be shown as X connected to Y1....Y6 on SBC on the SCD.

Figure A.16 - SBE function template schematic

An example – one measurement controls several




A.4.12.2.1 Function template schematic

Inputs	SBB		Outputs	
Position high feedback (connected/closed)	ХGН	Y	Normal function output	
Position low feedback (disconnected/open)	XGL	YH	Pulsed normal function output high (connect/close)	
External set high	ХН	YL	Pulsed normal function output low (disconnect/open)	
External set low	XL	YF	Function failed	
External outside set high	ХОН	BCH	Output position high confirmed (connected/closed)	
External outside set low	XOL	BCL	Output position low confirmed (disconnected/open)	
External fault	XF	BE	Status enabled	
Function externally enabled	XE	BA	Status auto/man	
External test position	XGX	BO	Status outside	
External earthed	XGZ	BS	Status safeguarding	
Lock safeguarding high	LSH	BB	Status blocked	
Lock safeguarding low	LSL	BU	Status suppressed	
Force safeguarding high	FSH			
Force safeguarding low	FSL			
Force disable transition high	FDH			
Force disable transition low	FDL			
Force blocking	FB			
Force suppression	FU			
Lock auto	LA			
Lock manual	LM			
Lock outside	LO			
Operator station			Operator station	
Auto/Manual			Alarms and faults	
Close (high)/ Open (low)			Open (disconnected) /	
			Closed(connected)	
Blocking on/off			Suppressed	
Suppression on/off			Auto/Manual/Outside	
			Earthed	
			Available	
			Test mode	
			Blocked	
			Disabled	
			Safeguarding Conflict	
			Connict	
	<u> </u>			

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Figure A.14 - SBB function template schematic

Power distribution SCD example - SBB




THE METHOD



Application design


- The SCDs should be jointly developed by the system disciplines, driven by user requirements, not by technology/discipline organization.
- The SCDs should as far as possible be developed in parallel with the P&IDs.



Predefined operational functions


- The P&ID developed by process department identifies the controllable objects. i.e instruments, valves, compressors, sentrifuges, pumps, heaters etc.
- Each object have their standard way to be operated, "PCE request" (P&ID) \rightarrow Functblock (SCD) \rightarrow attributes, the FB is an independent object itself.
- There will be some FB's that are not directly a "child" of an P&ID object. We should not make the need for them to be present on the P&ID.
- The "PCE requests" we have on the P&ID is much simpler identified, it is when you use the "Shared display/control" symbol (ref ISA 5.1). But again they will only link to some of the FB's

SCD cooperation – The review meeting



SCD'er – A multidiscipline cooperation

- The SCD methodology should create a common understanding across the involved disciplines, of how the equipment and process are controlled/operated
- Prepartion of SCD's is started early
- Based on documents from other disciplines, mechanical package and their attendance in "SCD review" meetings
- Used in HAZOP and other multidisciplinary reviews
- Basis for programming of logic
- Verified against during FAT
- Used by Commissioning
- Used for training




Other disicipline contributions to SCD

- Define instrumentation location and shutdown alarm actions (trip).
- Proposed control strategies and structures
- Point out considerations that must be taken care of with respect to control strategy in terms of limitations on equipment and process design
- Clarify requirements for startup and shutdown
- Define shutdown valves location and their function in terms of process shutdown and pressure relief
- Ensure that requirements for maintenance operability is followed
- Input documentation:
 - P&IDs, C&E, Shutdown hierarchy
 - D&IDs

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- Safety philosophies, SAT tables
- Package suppliers P&ID's/ Control narratives / Logic diagrams / C&E



Supporting Functional specification

- ICSS FS

App A FS Template example (INFORMATIVE)

	nent No.: XXXXXXXXXXXX			Rev.: 02		Page: 26 of 2	1
Classif	fication Code:						
Origina	tor: XXX	Tag No.:	System No. :	XX .	Area Co	de:	
expand	led. No numbere	d section shall be d	o suit each specific doo leleted. Superfluous nu ions may be included.				
CTR N	D.:						
Docum		Doc SAS FUNC SY SAS FUNC	SPECIFICATION TEM ument titles shall be: CTIONAL SPECIFICAS STEM <syst.no> SYSTEM NAME> e.g.: CTIONAL SPECIFICAS SYSTEM XX ON AND RE-INJECTIO</syst.no>	TION TION	8		
							+
							+
							1
02	DD.MM.YYY Y	ISSUED FOR ITT					
01	DD.MM.YYY Y	ISSUED FOR CLI	ENT REVIEW				
Rev.	Issue date	Description		Made by	Chk'd by	Disc. Appr.	Proj. Appr.
Project	no.:XXXXXXX	Contract No.:	xxxxxxxxxxxxx				
			Plant X				

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Insert NA in column "Representative" in all rows that are not relevant. Expand with additional rows as needed, e.g. to accommodate additional packages.

Each responsible party's signature below confirms that the parts of this document that are relevant for that party have been worked out in a manner satisfactory to that party, and that the result is complete and acceptable to that party.

The Instrumentation discipline is formally responsible for this document. The signature of the Instrumentation representative is found on the front sheet, and is not relevant here.

Responsible party	Package	Representative	Initials	Signature	Date	Notes
Instrumentation ¹	XXXX			See front sheet	See front sheet	
Process ²	XXXX					
Safety ³	XXXX					
HVAC ⁴	XXXX					
Electrical ⁵	XXXX					
SAS package vendor ⁶	XXXX					
Package vendor ⁷	XXXX					1
MTO workgroup ⁸	XXXX					
Subcontractor9	XXXX					

If a signature applies only to part of the document, e.g. for MTO signature for VDU picture specifications, this may be documented in the form of a note. Notes:

Insert any reservations that "Responsible party" needs to make in order to sign the matrix, e.g.: Strategy for control of xxx can not be finalised at this time, because of ...

Insert NA in column Representative for rows that is not applicable

Supporting Functional specification

1.2 Scope

This document covers monitoring and control of system *<syst.no>*, *<system name>*, by SAS directly, and/or indirectly via separate control systems where relevant. The document shall contain, either directly or by reference:

- Brief description of the process to be controlled (section 2)
- Description of the protective functions, including detailed specification of all SAS safety system functionality to be implemented for this system (section 4)
- Detailed specification of all non-protective SAS functionality to be implemented in SAS for this system, as well as listings of alarm groups and trends/reports (section 5)

Relevant Process system description, Operational Manual, System Control Diagrams (SCDs), control sequence specifications/tables, Cause & Effect charts, HMI screens and package specifications are referenced.

For efficiency and maintainability, references shall be used instead of text whenever there exists an official document with sufficient quality that can be referenced.

Supporting Functional Specification


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SCD development sequence - General

- SCD shall have complete multidisciplined IDC check at each release
- IDC prior to release for implementation is done in the form of a technical review meeting where all parties are present.
- SCD ' are distributed to those who get the P & ID's
- SCD ' are being developed and issued pr. process system
- Suggestions: 6 step sequence




Export of SCD to DCS supplier


Johan Sverdrup phase 2 will digitalise the SCD export to DCS supplier in the purpose of automatically generate the control application.

- Minimize DCS SW engineering manhours
- Avoid time spend «yellowlining» at FAT
- Go directly into functional verifaction on Simulator







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2017 - SCD



2017 - HMI



PAS IEC 63131 content

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IEC PAS 63131

- Next step is to reqruite experts to transfer it into a IEC standard.
 - Adopt IEC terminology
 - Clarify alignment towards existing standards

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IEC PAS 63131:2017	Download Hardcopy
System control diagram	English CHF 350.
TC 65 Additional information	Add to cart Do you need a multi-user copy?
Abstract	Look inside
IEC/PAS 63131:2017(E) defines a set of operational control functions (objects) and the associated logical diagram (System Control Diagram (SCD)), for use in the continuous control process industry – e.g. as used in Oil and Gas processes. The main drivers for establishing this as a standard are the advantage of efficient engineering, implementation, and commissioning, as well as reuse of the control application across different suppliers of control systems. The diagrams give a logical representation that is suited for data transfer. This PAS also includes a method of documenting sequences and their interaction with the control objects.	 Table of contents Foreword Introduction Scope Normative references
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